Abstract |
This article investigates the construction of an ideal compliance system under
China’s new Company Law through a comparative legal analysis. It begins by
identifying the existing challenges in China’s compliance framework, particularly the
historical dominance of shareholder primacy and the uneven distribution of
responsibilities under the previous Company Law. These issues have hindered the
development of an effective compliance system, necessitating a reevaluation of
corporate governance principles in China. The comparative analysis examines the
compliance systems in the United States and Japan, focusing on the frameworks and
key elements such as fiduciary duties and the application of the business judgment rule.
The study highlights significant differences in how these jurisdictions handle
compliance, providing insights into potential improvements for China’s system. This
section underscores the importance of adapting international best practices to local
contexts to enhance the effectiveness of corporate compliance in China. Finally, the
article proposes a dual-level compliance concept tailored to China’s unique legal and
corporate environment, integrating both private and public interests. It outlines specific
compliance duties for directors, supervisors, and other compliance personnel,
emphasizing the need for robust information transmission, whistleblower protections,
and temporary management systems. The conclusion calls for a comprehensive and
flexible compliance framework that not only ensures corporate profitability but also
promotes broader societal welfare, aligning with the evolving goals of corporate
governance in China. |